Background: Syringe reuse and other unsafe injection practices can expose patients to bloodborne pathogens (eg, hepatitis B and C viruses and human immunodeficiency virus). Evidence of such infection control lapses has resulted in patient notifications, but the scope and magnitude of these events have not been well characterized.
M edical errors can result in various forms of patient harm, including transmission of health care-associated infections. [1] [2] [3] Errors related to delivery of injections (eg, syringe reuse), long recognized in international settings, have recently been identified in the US health care settings and have resulted in outbreaks of hepatitis C virus (HCV), hepatitis B virus (HBV), and bacterial pathogens. [1] [2] [3] In addition, patients who were potentially exposed to unsafe injection practices have often required notification by a health department or health care facility to advise testing for bloodborne pathogen infections (eg, HCV, HBV, and human immunodeficiency virus). 1, 2, [4] [5] [6] These infections are often asymptomatic and not readily diagnosed without deliberate efforts by patients and practitioners.
Because of longstanding interest and expertise in injection safety, 7 the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) serves as the primary consultant to health departments and health care institutions on associated investigations and risk assessments and routinely provides guidance on related patient notification issues. Collectively, the scope and nature of these notification events have not been well described. In light of growing national interest and recognition of the serious threat of unsafe injection practices to patient safety, 8, 9 we summarized the recent US experience related to notification events stemming from these lapses.
METHODS
We summarized information from the US patient notification events that occurred since 2001. We defined an injection-safety-related notification event as written communication (ie, letter) directed to a group of patientsadvising individuals to seek bloodborne pathogen testing due to a potential exposure to inappropriate use and handling of supplies (eg, syringes, needles, intravenous tubing, medication vials, and parenteral solutions) for administering injections and infusions. In certain situations, notification occurred in multiple phases involving different patient groups or health care facilities; we treated these as a single event. We excluded incidents that involved isolated errors impacting a single patient. 10 Patient notification events prompted by other infection control breaches that are not related to the delivery of parenteral medications, including reuse of blood sampling equipment (eg, fingerstick devices) and errors with uncertain risk for bloodborne pathogen transmission (eg, endoscope reprocessing errors), were also excluded.
Although there is no formal system in the nation for tracking patient notification events, CDC has maintained records of all injection-safety-related investigations and notification events that involved CDC participation, consultation and/or laboratory assistance. These include published articles, official reports, investigation notes, and email correspondences. Through established channels (including CDC field staff), health departments managing injectionsafety investigations have kept CDC informed of the occurrence of these events in their state. In addition, since at least 2004, CDC staff has actively searched for injectionsafety-related events using online sources such as ProMed newsletter and Google news alerts (examples of terms used include, "unsafe injection" and "hepatitis") and used this information on occasion to engage health departments and health care institutions. We reviewed CDC records to identify injection-safety patient notifications conducted from January 2001 through December 2011 that met the aforementioned criteria. For notification events where CDC records were incomplete, we contacted health department personnel who had firsthand knowledge of the investigation and/or direct access to relevant data. In several instances, information from media reports was used to provide details that were lacking from both CDC and health department records. To supplement and help validate our review, we searched PubMed for any publications on injection-safety notification events.
We compiled the following information for each notification event identified: the affected state(s), time period, health care setting(s), type of unsafe injection practice(s) and implicated medications, confirmation of bloodborne pathogen transmission, the party that conducted the notification (eg, health care facility or the health department), and the total number of patients notified.
Review by the CDC Institutional Review Board was not required because none of the CDC records and correspondences with health departments contained patient identifiers, and no patients were contacted as part of this review.
RESULTS
We identified 35 patient notification events related to unsafe injection practices in 17 states and the District of Columbia from 2001 through 2011 (Table 1) . 7, Thirtyone (89%) of the identified events were associated with investigations that involved CDC participation, consultation and/or laboratory assistance, whereas 4 events (11%) were managed by health departments working closely with facilities. No additional events were identified through searches of peer-reviewed medical literature.
The estimated total number of persons notified as a result of a potential exposure to unsafe injection practices was 130,198; the median number of persons notified per event was 669 (range, 25-63,000 persons). Seventy-four percent of the identified notification events occurred since 2007 (n = 26) , including all 4 of the events that affected more than 5000 patients.
Twenty-two (63%) notification events were conducted in the context of identified HBV or HCV transmission, including 19 events that were associated with a recognized outbreak (detection of 2 or more cases). Of these 22 notification events, 19 (86%) involved patient-to-patient transmission, in which an infected patient was the source of infection for other patients. The other 3 events involved transmission from HCV-infected providers who abused injectable narcotics and exposed patients in the process of diverting these medications. The remaining 13 (37%) notification events were prompted by the discovery of unsafe injection practices, absent evidence of bloodborne pathogen transmission. For 2 events, unsafe practices were identified during public health investigations of outbreaks of bacterial infections. Most of the remaining events were prompted by reports from health care personnel regarding observed or suspected breaches by another provider. In several, notification and testing identified patients with viral hepatitis infection, but whether these persons acquired the infection as a result of the breach was not determined conclusively. 27, 29, 30 The primary breach implicated was accessing shared injectable medications with reused syringes (at least 16 notification events). However, overt reuse of syringes or insulin pens from one patient to another was also identified (at least 12 notification events), including the reuse of prefilled syringes to administer influenza vaccine or botulinum toxin. Other unsafe injection practices included the reuse of intravenous administration sets, single-use medication vials, and bags of saline solutions for multiple patients. Medications that were commonly implicated included anesthesia medications, such as propofol (7 notification events) and fentanyl (mainly in the context of narcotics diversion), saline flush solutions, and various infusion therapies containing vitamins or chelating agents. Eighty-three percent (n = 29) of notification events were associated with outpatient settings, including physician offices, specialty clinics, and alternative medicine clinics. In 21 (60%) notification events, letters to patients were sent by the health department in place of the provider or facility; all of these events involved an outpatient setting.
DISCUSSION
In the context of unsafe injection practices, the primary purpose of notification is to inform patients of their potential exposure to substandard care and advise bloodborne pathogen testing. Full disclosure of serious clinical adverse events to affected patients is increasingly becoming the standard of practice. 4, 5, 36 For errors that convey a high risk of physical harm to patients, the rationale for patient disclosure is compelling, irrespective of the number of patients involved and whether disease transmission has been established. 6 Public health has a critical role in the investigation of injection safety breaches and ensuing notification activities, 6 particularly when the identified breach extends across multiple health care facilities or involves providers who are not fully cooperative or capable of objectively and effectively managing the process themselves. Oftentimes, resulting infections might remain undetected unless patients are advised to undergo testing. This was evident in a recent public health investigation that involved a broad patient notification, resulting in the discovery of a second cluster of viral transmission in a separate facility where the implicated provider had also worked. 16 Thus, if not for the notification, the true extent of disease transmission and patient harm would have been underestimated. We found that the majority of notification events associated with patient-to-patient transmission were linked to reuse of syringes to withdraw medication from a container that was used for subsequent patients introducing risks of contamination and spread of infection. 2 Overt syringe reuse between patients was less frequently identified but accounted for the majority of patient notification events that were conducted in the absence of known disease transmission. According to a survey of health care providers who prepared and/or administered parenteral medications, nearly 1% have reused a syringe directly from one patient to another 37 ; such dangerous practice may stem from the misconception that changing only the needle is sufficient to prevent disease transmission. 2, 37 It is unsettling to consider that the events we identified may only represent a small fraction of a larger problem.
Limiting the use of medication vials to individual patient use could have prevented many of the associated outbreaks that we identified. In most instances, the shared medication (eg, propofol, saline) was labeled as single dose (or single use), meaning that it was approved only for use on a single patient. Providers have reported confusion over the appropriate use of medications packaged in large-volume vials in excess of the quantity required for routine singlepatient procedures, 2,37,38 emphasizing the need for targeted education in this area.
We identified 3 notification events associated with provider-to-patient transmission that involved fentanyl theft by a provider, resulting in at least 40 cases of HCV infection and the notification of over 13,000 patients. [23] [24] [25] [26] In these incidents, HCV infection was transmitted to patients as a consequence of overt syringe reuse (after the HCV-infected provider had self-injected) or from contamination of medication that was accessed with a used syringe. Because provider education may not be sufficient to prevent patient harm associated with narcotics diversion, prevention efforts should focus on developing engineered-safety medical devices, such as syringes that change color to indicate prior use or incorporate tamper-evident packaging in their design.
Eighty-three percent of identified notification events involved outpatient settings, including all 4 of the largest notification events. This finding might partly reflect an increasing trend toward outpatient health care delivery as well as a growing recognition of the risks associated with unsafe injection practices. 39 Although our finding may also be attributed to differential reporting due to the greater dependence of outpatient facilities on public health authorities, growing evidence indicates that infection control in these settings varies greatly. 40, 41 One study found that approximately two thirds of ambulatory surgical centers had lapses in infection control, including unsafe injection practices. 42 facilities do not fall within the purview of state or federal licensing/certification agencies and are not routinely inspected for adherence to recommended practices. Our US study has several limitations that likely resulted in an underestimation of the number of patients notified. First, without a centralized system for tracking patient notifications, we likely identified a fraction of all notification events resulting from unsafe injection practices. Second, differential reporting and publication bias might have overrepresented notifications in outpatient settings and in certain states. Third, the sources of data occasionally contained incomplete information on the total number of patients notified, as well as the number of patients who subsequently received testing and had results available for review. Fourth, our summary focused on written notifications sent to patients and did not take into account notifications conducted only by verbal communication (eg, phone calls). Finally, it should be noted that the scope of our review was limited to the US patient notifications. A number of large-scale, international injection-safety-related events have taken place in recent years but were not captured in our analysis. [43] [44] [45] In summary, since 2001, unsafe injection practices have resulted in the notification of over 130,000 patients, likely reflecting a sample of actual US notification events. Efforts are needed to improve the identification of notification events, identify best practices for conducting and managing patient notifications, ensure adequate and thorough investigations, and most importantly, prevent the occurrence of unsafe injection practices. This will require raising awareness among facilities to engage public health authorities when serious lapses are identified, allowing consistent tracking of these events and guidance on the notification process. In addition, conducting research to manage ethical challenges and to identify patient preferences regarding communication materials will inform development of best disclosure strategies. 4, 5 Finally, prevention of notification events and promotion of basic patient safety will require a comprehensive approach consisting of greater attention to basic infection control, increased oversight, and advancement and uptake of technologic innovation.
